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INTRODUCTION
This symposium essay concerns the relationship between religious
freedom, on the one hand, and nondiscrimination or equality on the other.
Its chief text is from the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776: “[A]ll
men [and women] are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience.”1 James Madison quoted the
provision in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance against religious
taxes in Virginia,2 and the First Congress chose the phrase “free exercise
* James L. Oberstar Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of St. Thomas School of Law
(Minnesota). Thanks to Professor Miguel Díaz and my longtime friend Randy Newman for inviting
me to the Loyola University Chicago Conference on “The Question of Religious Freedom,” to the
participants and audience members for stimulating conversation, and to Nick Davis for fine
research assistance. Portions of this Article also served as the Lin Lecture at St. Mary’s University
School of Law and the Veninga Lecture on Religion and Society at the Wisconsin Institute for
Public Policy and Service.
1. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 16, http://www.constitution.org/bcp/virg_dor.htm.
2. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (June 20,
1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 300, para. 4 (Robert A. Rutland et al.
eds., 1973).
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of religion” for its final version of what we know as the First
Amendment.3 This essay uses the Virginia language as the embarking
point to explore two theses about the relationship between religious
freedom and nondiscrimination. First, nondiscrimination is a crucial
component of religious freedom. But second, religious freedom is also a
value independent of nondiscrimination, and the two sometimes come in
conflict. When they do, we must give weight to both of these important
values. In particular, we should not simply subordinate the value of
religious freedom to the value of nondiscrimination. This essay suggests
why we should, and how we can, give substantial protection to both.
I. NONDISCRIMINATION AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
First, the Virginia Declaration emphasizes that all persons have “an
equal title to the free exercise of religion.”4 In other words, an essential
element of religious freedom is that it be equal for all faiths, all religious
positions. The United States Supreme Court has said that the requirement
of nondiscrimination among religions “is inextricably connected with the
continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause.”5 The reason is that
“[f]ree exercise . . . can be guaranteed only when legislators—and
voters—are required to accord to their own religions the very same
treatment given to small, new, or unpopular denominations.”6 Put in the
converse: If you want freedom for your faith, you must give it to others
as well.
Indeed, if religious freedom applies to some faiths more than others, it
is not truly religious freedom: rather, it is a policy for advancing the
favored faiths or their sociopolitical goals. The archetypal American
example is the Puritans who fled persecution in England only to inflict it
on others in Massachusetts.
Today we see this tendency operating repeatedly. For example,
Republicans often endorse religious freedom, but there is a big
counterexample: Their voters are strongly inclined to limit freedom and
equality for Muslims. When candidate Donald Trump issued his call for
a temporary “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the
United States,”7 polls showed that as many as seventy-one percent of
3. Madison’s language in his list of proposed amendments that ultimately became the Bill of
Rights was not much different: it provided that “the full and equal rights of conscience [shall not]
be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451–53 (1789) (Joseph Gales
ed., 1834).
4. In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison likewise emphasized the modifier “equal.”
Madison, supra note 2, at 300, para. 4.
5. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982).
6. Id.
7. See Dara Lind, Donald Trump Proposes “Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering
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Republicans approved.8 Trump eventually adopted narrower bans on
travel from seven (in some iterations, six) nations, most of which are
Muslim-dominated. When the Supreme Court upheld the narrowed ban,9
it signaled that the original proposed “complete” exclusion of Muslims
would have been unconstitutional beyond any doubt.10 But that complete
exclusion was very popular among conservatives.
Progressives are also failing to give equal freedom to Christian
conservatives, as I will discuss later.11 But for now, more about the antiMuslim campaigns, which include efforts to block the construction of
mosques in localities around the country. In the most notable such
controversy, a zoning permit application to expand a mosque in
Murfreesboro, Tennessee (near Nashville) triggered protests and rallies,
sometimes led by ministers, at which mosque opponents wore “Vote for
Jesus” t-shirts and carried signs saying “Keep Tennessee Terror Free!”12
Some contractors dropped out of the building project; one reportedly
explained, “I don’t want to get on bad terms with my preacher.”13 Some
acts went beyond protest: bomb threats and other harassing calls,
vandalism of construction equipment, bacon (impure to Muslims) and
graffiti smeared on doors and walls.14
A state court overturned the mosque’s permit, adopting a
higher-than-normal standard of public notice for the permit hearing
because it involved “an issue of major importance to citizens.”15 The
Islamic Center then sued for discriminatory treatment in federal court and
the United States,” VOX (Dec. 7, 2015, 5:57 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/12/7/9867900/
donald-trump-muslims (reprinting Trump campaign statement).
8. Kristina Wong, Poll: Half of American Voters Back Trump’s Muslim Ban, THE HILL (Mar.
29, 2016, 5:30 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/274521-poll-half-of-american-voters-backtrumps-muslim-ban.
9. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
10. See, e.g., id. at 2418, 2421, 2423 (noting that the ultimate ban was “facially [religion-]
neutral” and applied to nations “cover[ing] just 8% of the world’s Muslim population”).
11. See infra notes 84–88 and accompanying text, and infra Part II.
12. New Mosques Face Hostility Far from Ground Zero, CBS NEWS (Aug. 9, 2010, 9:48 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-mosques-face-hostility-far-from-ground-zero/;
Annie
Gowen, Far from Ground Zero, Other Plans for Mosques Run Into Vehement Opposition, WASH.
POST (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/22/
AR2010082202895.html.
13. Jamie Gumbrecht, Embattled Tennessee Mosque to Move Forward with Construction, CNN
BELIEF BLOG (Sept. 2, 2011, 10:18 PM), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/02/embattledtennessee-mosque-to-move-forward-with-construction/.
14. Nancy DeGennaro, Murfreesboro Mosque Defaced with Graffiti, Bacon, USA TODAY (July
10, 2017, 5:58 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/07/10/murfreesboromosque-defaced-graffiti-bacon/466122001/.
15. See Verified Complaint at 7, para. 45, Islamic Ctr. of Murfreesboro v. Rutherford Cty. (M.D.
Tenn. July 18, 2012), https://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/Verified-Complaint-2-07.18.12.pdf
(quoting state court).
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prevailed under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA).16 The Becket Fund, the mosque’s counsel, commented that
“no house of worship should be kept from meeting just because because
the neighbors dislike their religious beliefs,” adding: “No religion is an
island. When the rights of one faith are abridged, the rights of all faiths
are threatened.”17
Conservatives have also led efforts to ban so-called sharia law in the
United States and to step up the surveillance of mosques. A number of
conservative leaders, like Russell Moore of the Southern Baptist
Convention, have spoken and acted in favor of Muslims’ religious
freedom; but Moore faced strong criticism from within the denomination
for doing so.18 As one observer puts it, “Christian conservatives have
grown less sympathetic to Muslim religious freedom at exactly the
moment that their rhetoric on behalf of religious freedom has grown more
thunderous.”19
But for religious conservatives to attack, or fail to defend, Muslim
religious freedom is a serious error—of pragmatics and of principle. A
group must stand up for others in order to have credibility when asserting
its own freedom. Moreover, too many conservatives ignore that the same
arguments used against Muslims’ religious freedom can turn against their
own.
For example, anti-Muslim opponents may justify broad surveillance of
Muslim institutions based on slippery-slope arguments that relaxing
surveillance will permit terrorist activity to grow. 20 But if slippery-slope
16. United States v. Rutherford Cty., No. 3:12-0737, 2012 WL 2930076, at *1–2 (M.D. Tenn.
July 18, 2012).
17. Mosque Free to Open, a Win for All Houses of Worship, BECKET (Aug. 10, 2012),
https://www.becketlaw.org/media/mosque-free-open-win-religious-houses-worship/
(quoting
Luke Goodrich); Islamic Center of Murfreesboro v. Rutherford County, BECKET,
https://www.becketlaw.org/case/islamic-center-murfreesboro-v-rutherford-county/#caseDetail
(last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
18. Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra, Southern Baptists Back Away from Backing Mosques, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY (Feb. 8, 2017, 10:42 AM), https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2017/february/
southern-baptists-back-away-from-backing-mosques-imb-erlc.html.
19. Peter Beinart, When Conservatives Oppose ‘Religious Freedom,’ ATLANTIC (Apr. 11,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/when-conservatives-opposereligious-freedom/522567/. In one of the latest examples, some Texas Republican activists are
opposing the selection as state party officials of both a Muslim man and his Christian wife, claiming
that recognizing Muslims as leaders contributes to “stealth jihad.” Bobby Ross Jr., Texas GOP
Dispute Pits Religious Freedom against Claims of “Stealth Jihad,” RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Dec.
11, 2018), https://religionnews.com/2018/12/11/texas-gop-dispute-pits-religious-freedom-againstclaims-of-stealth-jihad/.
20. See, e.g., Jeremy Diamond, Trump Doubles Down on Calls for Mosque Surveillance, CNN
(June 15, 2016, 8:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/15/politics/donald-trump-muslimsmosque-surveillance/.
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arguments are legitimate, they could also prevent any exemption for
religious conservatives from nondiscrimination laws—even, for
example, in the narrow context of a wedding ceremony—on the ground
that it would lead to broad exemptions for discrimination throughout
society. Similarly, opponents of Islam may seek to block construction of
a mosque by making dubious claims about the noise or traffic it will
cause21—but the same arguments can block construction of a church or a
Christian food pantry.
So-called anti-sharia laws proposed or enacted in several states present
another example. Ostensibly aimed at oppressive practices seen in other
nations—like stoning of adulterers or severe restrictions on
women22—the provisions have frequently been so broad that they would
prevent even the legal enforcement of contracts between two equal parties
that incorporate Islamic norms, or agreements to arbitrate disputes under
such norms. Sharia can be used for many entirely legitimate purposes:
dividing estates, governing Muslim religious bodies, or structuring
commercial relationships.23 If two Muslim businesspersons can be
prevented from arbitrating their disputes according to Islamic business
ethics, two Christians could similarly be prevented from using the
increasingly popular “Christian conciliation” services.24 On similar
principles, traditionalist Christian couples could be prevented from
agreeing to even the most moderate forms of “covenant marriage”
limiting, based on religious doctrine, the grounds for divorce.25
The first generation of anti-sharia measures explicitly targeted sharia
as the one form of religious or foreign law a court was categorically
forbidden to enforce.26 Such discrimination is patently unconstitutional,
21. Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 302 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The
City’s approval of applications for zoning exceptions by other churches . . . undermines the City’s
contention that the Board denied a zoning exception to the Muslims solely for the purposes of traffic
control and public safety.”); Islamic Soc’y of Basking Ridge v. Twp. of Bernards, 226 F. Supp. 3d
320, 347–52 (D.N.J. 2016) (holding that township applied parking and traffic standard
discriminatorily against mosque).
22. Robert K. Vischer, The Dangers of Anti-Sharia Laws, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 2012),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2012/03/the-dangers-of-anti-sharia-laws.
23. Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia Initiatives, 10
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363, 40406 (2012); James A. Sonne, Domestic Applications of Sharia and
the Exercise of Ordered Liberty, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 717, 72841 (2015).
24. See A Letter from the ICC Directors, INST. FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION,
http://www.iccpeace.com/index.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2018). See also Prescott v. Northlake
Christian Sch., 369 F.3d 491, 498 (5th Cir. 2004); Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In
Religious Arbitration, Scripture Is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-scripture-is-therule-of-law.html.
25. Sonne, supra note 23, at 74647.
26. For the three categories listed here, see Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 23, at 37275; Sonne,
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and the leading case struck down Oklahoma’s enacted provision.27 A
second group would prohibit enforcement of any religious law or code.28
The third most recent group of measures prohibit the enforcement of any
“foreign” law, not just sharia or other religious law, but would still
prevent Muslims from structuring their affairs according to religious
belief.29 The background of these later-generation statutes “plainly
reveals their target is sharia and the affairs of Muslims, with
particularized stigma on the basis of religious belief the inevitable
result.”30
There are hard cases, for example, where Islamic law in some forms
makes it far easier for a husband to divorce his wife than vice versa
(talaq).31 Our courts have divided over whether and when to recognize
such a summary divorce, which may have occurred under the laws of
another nation when the couple resided there.32 But American courts have
longstanding principles to apply in such cases. They generally give
“comity” to contracts and judicial decrees entered under another legal
system—but subject to limits. The contract must be the product of free
consent, not duress, and it must not violate fundamental public policies
of our own system.33 The public policy exception would forbid harmful
discrimination as well including cruel or unusual punishments. With such
limits in place, there is no justification for adopting broad rules against
sharia law or “religious law.”
Some prominent anti-Muslim voices, like Rev. Pat Robertson, even
claim Islam is not a religion.34 During the Tennessee controversy, the
state’s lieutenant governor, running in the Republican primary, said that
Islam resembled “a violent political philosophy more than [a]

supra note 23, at 744–52.
27. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming preliminary injunction
against anti-sharia measure adopted by initiative into state constitution).
28. Sonne, supra note 23, at 746.
29. Id. at 75152.
30. Id. at 752.
31. Id. at 73132 (“[S]haria typically also requires marrying couples to first enter a ‘mahr’
agreement, under which the husband pays a monetary penalty in the event of such summary
divorce.”).
32. Id. at 73234.
33. Id. at 73941, 75557; Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 23, at 418; Vischer, supra note 22; see
also Awad, 670 F.3d at 112931 (noting anti-sharia measure served no compelling interest because
state had not identified “a single instance where an Oklahoma court had applied Sharia law . . . , let
alone that such applications or uses had resulted in concrete problems.”).
34. Brian Tashman, Pat Robertson: Islam is Not a Religion But a Military Group ‘Bent on
World
Domination,’
RIGHT
WING
WATCH
(Dec.
8,
2015,
1:05
PM),
http://www.rightwingwatch.org/post/pat-robertson-islam-is-not-a-religion-but-a-military-groupbent-on-world-domination/.
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peace-loving religion.”35 This is a canard, of course, since only a tiny
fraction of Muslims in America support any sort of violence or
domination.36
In any event, such rhetoric can be, and is, turned against conservative
Christians. That fact was dramatized in the recent Masterpiece case,37
where baker Jack Phillips was sued under Colorado civil rights laws for
refusing to design a custom cake for a same-sex wedding. Members of
the state commission hearing the case spoke disparagingly of Phillips’s
traditionalist religious beliefs; most aggressively, one compared
Phillips’s refusal with slavery and the Holocaust and called it “one of the
most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their
religion to hurt others.”38 The Supreme Court reversed the state order
against Phillips on the ground that it was inappropriate for commissioners
to show such “hostility” toward the party whose case they were charged
with deciding in a “fair and neutral” manner.39 As Justice Kennedy wrote
for the Court: “To describe a man’s faith as ‘one of the most despicable
pieces of rhetoric that people can use’ is to disparage his religion in at
least two distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by
characterizing it as merely rhetorical—something insubstantial and even
insincere.”40
But the commissioners were simply echoing widespread comments in
progressive circles, like the 2015 New York Times editorial that asserted
the objecting wedding vendors “us[e] religion as a cover for bigotry.” 41
You can find the same charge any day in online comments. To take just
one example, from an article I happened across as I was drafting the first
version of this essay: “The religious right isn’t a religious movement.
[It’s] a political movement that uses religion as a cover to justify and
rationalize its political views.”42
35. DeGennaro, supra note 14; Andrew Hough, Ron Ramsey: Tennessee Republican Politician
Under Fire in ‘Islam is a Cult’ Row, TELEGRAPH (July 27, 2010, 11:45 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/7913579/Ron-Ramsey-Tennessee-Republicanpolitician-under-fire-in-Islam-is-a-cult-row.html.
36. Michael Lipka, Muslims and Islam: Key Findings in the U.S. and Around the World, PEW
RES. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islamkey-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/.
37. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
38. Id. at 1729.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Editorial, In Indiana, Using Religion as a Cover for Bigotry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/opinion/in-indiana-using-religion-as-a-cover-forbigotry.html?auth=regi-lite.
42. Nu Mil 3 Design, Comment to Joshua C. Wilson, The Christian Right’s Problematic Rights
Claims, THE HILL (Jan. 25, 2018, 1:30 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/370698-the-
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Undoubtedly, some people hate gays and lesbians and employ
religious notions to hide that hate. But the wedding vendor objectors
generally have sincere claims of conscience about the nature of marriage:
they turn away good business from same-sex weddings, risk social
backlash in doing so, and are generally willing to serve same-sex couples
in every other context except weddings.43 They deserve the presumption
that they have a serious claim of conscience, even if not every act based
on that conscience is protected.
But if Christians ask for the presumption that their beliefs are serious
and in good faith, they must give the same to Muslims and others.
Religious freedom must be for all.
Masterpiece solidifies three important principles for free exercise
cases challenging official religious discrimination; all are familiar equal
protection principles applied to claims of religious inequality. First, the
court can look behind a facially neutral law to challenge discriminatory
intent in its adoption or application. That was one holding of Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, which invalidated
ordinances gerrymandered to prohibit animal sacrifices in Santeria
religious rituals.44 Masterpiece extends the principle to invalidate hostile
and unequal enforcement of a facially neutral public accommodation law.
The equal protection analogue is, among others, Yick Wo v. Hopkins.45
Second, in seeking evidence of discriminatory intent, the court can
consider a wide range of facts. In Masterpiece, the evidence came not
only from the Colorado commissioners’ disparaging statements, but also
from the disparate treatment the commission gave Phillips compared with
three other bakers who had refused a customer’s request to provide a cake
displaying a message against same-sex activity.46 The commission and
the Colorado courts held those refusals lawful, but Phillips’s refusal
unlawful.47 The Supreme Court found that the state had been inconsistent
in applying arguments to the two situations, which further indicated the
state had “disfavor[ed] the religious basis of [Phillips’s] objection.”48
The next Part returns to that holding; the point here is that Masterpiece
christian-rights-problematic-rights-claims.
43. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724 (quoting Joint Appendix at 152, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111)) (describing Phillips’s position); State v. Arlene’s Flowers,
Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 54950 (Wash. 2017) (noting that florist had provided numerous non-wedding
arrangements for the plaintiffs and other same-sex couples), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct.
2671 (2018).
44. 508 U.S. 520, 53739 (1993).
45. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
46. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728.
47. Id. at 1730.
48. Id. at 173031.
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directs courts in free exercise cases to be flexible in seeking indicia of
hostility, discriminatory intent, or devaluing of religion. Discriminatory
intent toward religion can be inferred in many ways just as in cases
alleging racially discriminatory intent like Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Housing Development Corp.49 Protection against discriminatory
prohibition of religious conduct, in Lukumi’s words, is the “minimum”
guarantee of free exercise.50 Masterpiece follows on that to reaffirm that
the clause “bars even ‘subtle departures from neutrality’ on matters of
religion.”51
Finally, Masterpiece arguably authorizes finding hostility or
discriminatory motive from “contemporary statements by members of the
decisionmaking body,” as Arlington Heights authorizes in the context of
racial discrimination.52 In Lukumi, only two justices (one of them Justice
Kennedy) drew on the legislative record of the ordinances in question to
show that they were hostile to the Santeria sect.53 And the Masterpiece
majority opinion distinguishes the adjudicatory setting—where there is
special concern that decisionmakers be unbiased—from the legislative
setting in Lukumi.54 However, four justices in Masterpiece (Kagan and
Breyer concurring, and Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissenting) did not
appear to adopt the distinction between adjudicatory and legislative
contexts. And Justice Kennedy had also considered the legislators’
statements in Lukumi.55
49. 429 U.S. 252, 26668 (1977) (listing various categories of “circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent”).
50. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
51. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534).
52. 429 U.S. at 268.
53. 508 U.S. at 54042 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
54. 138 S. Ct. at 1730.
55. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540. Admittedly, given that Justice Kennedy has left the Court, it seems
questionable whether attention to decision-makers’ anti-religious statements will become a strong
factor outside adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory contexts. See Leslie Kendrick & Micah
Schwartzman, Comments: The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 149 (2018),
https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/133-170_Online.pdf.
Professors Kendrick and Schwartzman criticize the findings of animus in Masterpiece Cakeshop;
in their judgment, the commissioners “t[ook] seriously [Phillips’s] religious claims . . . and
generally accord[ed] them respect.” Id. at 143. Unsurprisingly, religious conservatives interpret the
statements differently. In my view, the Court ought to rely less on attributing animus to government
officials—whether to traditionalist or progressive officials—and more on applying heightened
constitutional scrutiny when claims are raised either for LGBT equality or for religious-freedom
protection. See Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors?,
2017–2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 154–59, 161–63. Outside of obvious cases (like Trump’s
anti-Muslim statement), what constitutes animus versus disagreement is in the eye of the beholder.
Id. at 155–56. And attributing animus to the other side is likely to inflame polarization—a serious
concern in the nation today—while adopting heightened scrutiny tends more to call attention to
features of a claim (whether for LGBT equality or religious freedom) that evoke sympathy for the
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Masterpiece was soon followed by Trump v. Hawaii,56 where a 5–4
majority ruled the other way, upholding President Trump’s ban on travel
from seven countries, five of them overwhelmingly Muslim—despite
Trump’s blatant statements of anti-Muslim hostility that led to the ban.
(He not only called for the temporary “total and complete shutdown” of
Muslims entering the country but added other statements such as “I think
Islam hates us.”57) The majority disregarded those statements, although
in Masterpiece it relied on the commissioners’ statements to support a
finding of unconstitutional hostility.58
It is unfair to accuse the Court’s majority of rank hypocrisy in these
two cases, as some have done.59 But the Trump majority certainly failed
in an important opportunity to give teeth to the basic constitutional
principle against official religious bigotry. No one doubted that Trump’s
original proposal would have been blatantly unconstitutional. An
exclusion, however temporary, based simply on religious affiliation
contravenes “the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility [or wrongdoing].”60
The Trump majority held that the president’s statements were
irrelevant because, under previous cases governing immigration policies,
courts do not look behind the terms of a facially neutral policy for which
the executive offers a “‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ reason.”61 It is
easy enough on that ground to distinguish the travel ban from
Masterpiece; courts give great deference to the executive branch in the
context of immigration and national security. Moreover, the context of
Masterpiece involved statements by commissioners acting as
adjudicators.62 We have a special concern that judges deciding an
individual’s case should not give even the appearance of partiality.
But as constitutional scholar Ira Lupu once observed, “every [religious
freedom] case has a context.”63 The travel ban was also distinguishable
the other way, because Trump’s statements were even more clearly
claimant’s predicament. Id. at 156–59, 161–63.
56. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
57. Id. at 2417 (quoting Joint Appendix at 120–21, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No.
16-111)); see Thomas Schleifer, Donald Trump: ‘I Think Islam Hates Us,’ CNN (Mar. 10, 2016,
5:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/index.html.
58. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 244647 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the different
treatment of the two cases).
59. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, The Supreme Court’s Indefensible Double Standard in the Travel-Ban
Case and Masterpiece Cakeshop, VOX (June 27, 2018, 9:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-bigidea/2018/6/27/17509248/travel-ban-religious-discrimination-christian-muslim-double-standard.
60. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 n.2 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quotations omitted).
61. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972)).
62. 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018).
63. Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 757 (1992).
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indicative of the decisionmaker’s motivation than those in Masterpiece:
He alone was the ultimate decisionmaker. Moreover, his statements were
especially unambiguous in attacking all people of a religion merely for
their membership in it. The Masterpiece commissioners’ statements were
bad, but Trump’s were worse. His statements, which post-dated as well
as pre-dated his inauguration, created a strong inference that the ban
would not have issued were it not for those hostility-based promises and
his desire to be able to say he had fulfilled them. That rule, as discussed
earlier, governs in racial discrimination cases: Even a facially
race-neutral law that harms a racial minority is unconstitutional if the
motivation for adopting the law was to harm that minority. 64 The same
rule should apply to claims of religious discrimination.
The Trump majority held that this general rule of looking beyond the
order’s terms, including considering the decisionmaker’s statements,
should be inapplicable to immigration policies. Focusing on those terms
alone, the majority held that they did not show a clear pattern of
anti-Muslim intent.65 The ban affected only a few nations, all of which
had been subject to restrictions—albeit less severe ones—in the past.66
The justices disagreed over whether the previous immigration cases
dictated that conclusion. But there was room in those precedents for the
court to write a narrow opinion focusing on Mr. Trump’s uniquely blatant
and irresponsible statements, which evidence his intent as the sole
decisionmaker.67 Admittedly, such a ruling would have to have been
narrow, to keep from setting a precedent for serious intrusions on
executive authority in future cases.
But the risks from such an opinion would have been worth taking. The
president’s statements were virtually unprecedented in modern times in
explicitly labeling all members of a religion a danger to the nation. The
consequences of the resulting ban were serious for those hit by it: many
thousands of entirely innocent people were restricted from visiting their
family members, pursuing educational and other opportunities, etc. The
consequences of the statements extend further, poisoning the culture in
the country for Muslims already here. Reports of anti-Muslim vandalism
64. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
65. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2421.
66. Id.
67. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, id. at 2440 & n.5, distinguished Mandel and other cases on
several grounds: (1) they involved challenges to the exclusion of particular individuals while the
travel ban “affect[ed] millions of individuals on a categorical basis”; (2) they did not involve the
Establishment Clause, under which the “[f]acial neutrality [of a measure] is not determinative”;
(first alteration in original) and (3) plaintiffs made “an affirmative showing of bad faith” in that the
ban was a pretext for anti-Muslim hostility.
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and other crimes have spiked in the wake of Trump’s “complete
shutdown” tweets and other statements.68
The consequences are also harmful for religious freedom as a
principle. Republican voters’ support even for Trump’s most blatant
hostility69 has helped accelerate the perception that they treat religious
freedom as no more than a tool to use or discard according to what will
advance their preferred policy positions. As the next Part will discuss,
progressives are selective, too, in that they denigrate the religious
freedom of social conservatives. To preserve religious freedom as a
principle, not a tool, we must enforce it for all.
Our constitutional system has many strict rules against official actions
that show blatant hostility to an ethnicity, religion, or other vulnerable
group. The court should have adopted a strict rule here too.
There are three sources of comfort. First, the ban had narrowed and
softened in significant ways by the time of its third version, EO-3, after
lower-court decisions had struck down the two previous versions.70
Constitutional protections did not eliminate the harms to Muslims, but
they reduced them. Second, plaintiffs whose religious practices are
harmed by the ban—for example, mosques or other Muslim organizations
seeking to welcome immigrants as members—may still have claims
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,71 which has no exception
for immigration cases.
Finally, given the majority’s clear emphasis on the immigration
context, it is likely that courts will still act decisively to forbid official
animus against Muslims in domestic matters: hostile local resistance to
mosques,72 officials’ attacks on copies of the Quran,73 and so forth. The
travel ban decision must not be read to undermine that bedrock principle.

68. See, e.g., Kelly Weill, Hate Crimes Spiked after Trump’s Anti-Muslim Tweets, Study Finds,
DAILY BEAST (May 14, 2018, 7:03 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/hate-crimes-spiked-aftertrumps-anti-muslim-tweets-study-finds (reporting study from University of Warwick).
69. See notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
70. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 240406, 242123 (describing how EO-3 emerged from interagency
review process, added coverage of non-Muslim nations, and created waiver process for immigrants
suffering “undue hardship” who posed no threat to national security).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (requiring that federal actions imposing substantial burden on
religious exercise must be justified by compelling governmental interest).
72. See, e.g., Islamic Soc’y of Basking Ridge v. Twp. of Bernards, 226 F. Supp. 3d 320 (D.N.J.
2016); United States v. Rutherford Cty., No. 3:12-0737, 2012 WL 2930076 (M.D. Tenn. July 18,
2012).
73. See, e.g., Harris v. Escamilla, 736 F. App’x 618 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing summary
judgment for prison guard who allegedly intentionally stomped on and desecrated inmate’s Quran).
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II. “NONDISCRIMINATION VERSUS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM”
For the reasons listed above, nondiscrimination is crucial to religious
freedom. But it does not exhaust the concept. What all persons retain
equally, according to the Virginia Declaration and the First Amendment,
is the right to “the free exercise of religion.”74 Equality is little comfort
without a baseline guarantee of actual freedom; equality alone could
mean equal suppression of all religions. Furthermore, the phrase “free
exercise” implies more than just freedom to worship in the church,
temple, or mosque. It means room to exercise religion in all aspects of
life, in charitable work, and in other activities of one’s life.75
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence
took a turn thirty years ago toward reducing free exercise to a right solely
against discrimination. The prime constitutional question on religious
liberty has concerned laws that do not single out religion on their face but
that nevertheless, in a particular case, clash with a religious
practice—usually that of a religious minority. From the 1960s through
the 1980s, the Supreme Court held that even a facially neutral—that is,
facially nondiscriminatory—law must not be applied in a way that
substantially burdened a religious practice, unless the restriction was
necessary to serve a “compelling governmental interest.”76 That rule
treated free exercise as a substantive value of real importance.
In 1990, however, the Court decided Employment Division v. Smith,77
ruling that the state of Oregon could apply a general prohibition on peyote
to Native Americans who consume the drug as a sacrament in their
religious worship, regardless of how minimal the government’s interest
was in regulating that particular use. Smith said that the Free Exercise
Clause offers no protection against laws that are “neutral [toward religion
and] generally applicable.”78 That language has varying potential
meanings, but many lower courts have taken it to mean that free exercise
blocks only those laws that “single out . . . [r]eligion for unfavorable
treatment,” showing “a desire to target or suppress religious exercise.”79
74. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 16, http://www.constitution.org/bcp/virg_dor.htm.
75. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 146061 (1990) (In protecting “exercise” instead
of “worship,” “[t]he federal free exercise clause seems in every respect to have followed the most
expansive models among the states.”).
76. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
77. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
78. Id. at 881; see also id. at 879.
79. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 70102 (9th Cir.
1999), vacated on ripeness grounds 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Other cases support
a contrary interpretation, that religious exercise must be protected if even one or a few instances of
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On that view, the state can treat religious exercise as poorly as other
activities that it treats poorly.
Congress disagreed sharply with Smith, and it responded in 1993 by
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which reinstated
the rule that any substantial government burden on religious exercise had
to be justified by a compelling government interest—whether the law
discriminated against religion or not.80 But RFRA, whose passage was
nearly unanimous, has since become highly controversial. Indiana’s
enactment of a state version of RFRA in 2015 prompted widespread
outrage on social media and boycott threats by organizations ranging
from Yelp to the NCAA.81 The chief reasons for the change were
culture-wars issues: claims by religious traditionalists for protection
against being forced to facilitate same-sex weddings or same-sex-family
adoptions, and against being forced to cover contraception in employees’
insurance under the Obama administration’s implementation of the
Affordable Care Act.82 In 1993, Bill Clinton had signed the original
RFRA with an accompanying statement calling the law “majestic” and
commending the “shared desire [it reflected] to protect perhaps the most
precious of all American liberties, religious freedom.”83 In 2015, Hillary
Clinton condemned the Indiana RFRA, saying it was “sad this new
Indiana law can happen in America today.”84
The controversy over the Indiana RFRA exemplifies a more general
trend in which many progressives have become increasingly dubious, or
at least uneven, about any special value for religious freedom. A federal
bill to amend RFRA—supported only by Democrats—would eliminate
religious liberty claims against civil rights laws in all instances.85 An
increasing number of progressive and liberals reject not just particular
claims, but the very idea of giving religious liberty any weight when the
religious conduct in question is “discriminatory.” In 2016, the
analogous secular conduct are protected. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12
v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999); Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally
Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2016).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
81. Robert King, RFRA: Boycotts, Bans and a Growing Backlash, INDY STAR (Apr. 2, 2015,
11:38
AM),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/01/rfra-boycotts-bansgrowing-backlash/70810178/.
82. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
83. Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 2 PUB. PAPERS
2000–01 (Nov. 16, 1993).
84. Anne Gearan, Is Hillary Clinton Against the Religious Freedom Law Bill Clinton Backed?,
WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/04/03/
is-hillary-clinton-against-the-religious-freedom-law-bill-clinton-backed/?utm_term=
.82725e901e86.
85. Do No Harm Act, H.R. 3222, 115th Cong. (2017).
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Democratic-majority US Commission on Civil Rights issued an official
report finding that religious exemptions from nondiscrimination laws,
even “when [the exemptions] are permissible, significantly infringe upon
these civil rights” and therefore must be “narrowly” confined. 86 The
Commission endorsed the notion that religious liberty protects only belief
and excludes conduct—despite the First Amendment’s protection for the
“free exercise” of religion.87 The commission’s chair, writing separately,
dismissed claims of religious liberty in the civil rights context as
“hypocrisy” and as “code words for discrimination, intolerance, racism,
sexism, homophobia, Islamophobia, [and] Christian supremacy.” 88
These positions are wrong and counterproductive. Nondiscrimination
rules should not wholly trump religious-liberty claims by religious
conservatives any more than assertions of “national security” should
wholly trump religious-liberty claims by Muslims. Religious freedom, no
less than nondiscrimination, is a fundamental value; courts and
legislatures should give strong weight to both. What follows are (A) a
further argument for protecting both rights and (B) suggestions for ways
by which we can do so. It draws on my previous work, often with
Professor Douglas Laycock, in litigation and in scholarship—supporting,
for example, both the same-sex couples in Obergefell v. Hodges89 and the
baker in Masterpiece.90
A. Parallels Between Rights to Same-Sex Relationships and to
Religious Liberty
It is ironic and sad that gay rights and religious freedom are seen as
86. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING
NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES 25–26 (Sept. 2016),
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/Peaceful-Coexistence-09-07-16.PDF.
87. See id. at 26 (saying that such a doctrine “is fairer and easier to apply” and adding that
religious organizations should not be able to demand standards of behavior of any of their
employees except for “ministers”); see also id. (finding that “a doctrine that distinguishes between
beliefs (which should be protected) and conduct (which should conform to the law) is fairer and
easier to apply; . . . third parties, such as employees, should not be forced to live under the religious
doctrines of their employers [unless the employer is allowed to impose such constraints by virtue
of the ministerial exception].”) (brackets in original).
88. Id. at 29 (statement of Martin R. Castro, Chair).
89. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (extending constitutional right to marry to
same-sex couples).
90. See Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
1821, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No.
16-111); Brief of Douglas Laycock et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1316,
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-574). See also Douglas Laycock
& Thomas C. Berg, Protecting Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
1 (2013), http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/protecting-same-sex-marriage-andreligious-liberty; Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have
in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 21226 (2010).
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fundamentally incompatible, for in fact they involve essentially parallel
claims. The strongest features of the case for same-sex civil marriage
show an equally strong case for protecting the religious liberty of
dissenters.91
1. Personal identity
The first parallel concerns personal identity. Both same-sex couples
and committed religious believers argue that some aspects of human
identity are so fundamental that they should be left to each individual,
free of all nonessential regulation, even when manifested in conduct. For
same-sex couples, the conduct at issue is to join personal commitment
and sexual expression in a multi-faceted intimate relationship with the
person they love. In extending the right to marry to same-sex couples, the
Supreme Court emphasized that decisions concerning marriage “are
among the most intimate that an individual can make” and that “[t]here
is dignity in the bond between two men or two women” who make the
“profound choice” to marry.92
But religious commitment is no less a central feature of personal
identity. Religious believers seek to live and act consistently with the
commands of the Being that they believe made us all and holds the world
together. When the law requires them to violate their faith, they face a
painful choice between authorities: fearing punishment for violating
God’s norms, or the loss of the highest form of fulfilment. Moreover, as
the marriage relationship pervades a person’s life, so too does religious
commitment. Through what other single institution or belief system can
a person do all of the following: raise and educate one’s children, mark
births and deaths, meet weekly for sessions of inspiration and teaching,
seek personal counseling from a leader, receive moral guidance for one’s
conduct, and devote time to serving others?93

91. For similar arguments about such parallels, see Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other
Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and
the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389, 399–408 (2010); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of
Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2416−30 (1997).
92. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
93. See Brownstein, supra note 91. Although other human activities parallel some of these
features “there is no other human phenomenon that combines all of [them].” Michael W.
McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 42 (2000); id. (“[I]f there
were such a concept, it would probably be viewed as a religion.”). See also Alan E. Brownstein,
The Right Not to Be John Garvey, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 807 (1998) (reviewing JOHN H.
GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996)) (“Almost any other individual decision pales in
comparison to the serious commitment to religious faith.”).
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2. Difficult/impossible to change
For both same-sex couples and religious believers, their identity is
painful at best to change. As Professor Laycock and I have written:
No religious believer can change his understanding of divine
command by any act of will, and no person who wants to enter a
same-sex marriage can change his sexual orientation by any act of will.
Religious beliefs can change over time; far less commonly, sexual
orientation can change over time. But these things do not change
because government says they must, or because the individual decides
they should; for most people, one’s sexual orientation and one’s
understanding of what God commands are experienced as
involuntary. . . . The same-sex partners cannot change their sexual
orientation, and the religious believer cannot change God’s mind. . . .94

3. Conduct
For both groups, their identity manifests itself immediately in conduct.
The states that refused same-sex civil marriage argued that they treated
people differently based on the conduct of marriage, not on their
orientation. Essentially, they claimed that a gay man suffered no
inequality or burden, because he could remain celibate or marry a woman.
The courts correctly rejected this claim, holding that both the orientation
and the conduct that follows immediately from it are central to a person’s
identity.95
But religious believers face similar attempts to distinguish their
religious beliefs from the conduct based on those beliefs, and to treat their
conduct as subject to any and all state regulation. Critics often say to the
religious claimant, “You can believe whatever you want, but don’t act on
it.” But believers cannot fail to act on God’s will, and it is no more
reasonable for the state to demand that they do so than for the state to
demand celibacy of all gays and lesbians. Both religious believers and
same-sex couples feel compelled to act on those things constitutive of
their identity, and they face parallel legal objections to their actions.
4. Conduct in society
For both groups, the conduct involved is not merely insular and
private. Both same-sex couples and religious dissenters seek to live out
their identities in ways that are public—that is, socially apparent and
socially acknowledged. Same-sex couples claim a right beyond private
94. Brief of Laycock et al. in Obergefell, supra note 90, at 14. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862, 885, 893 (Iowa 2009) (“[S]exual orientation is central to personal identity and ‘may be altered
[if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to the individual’s sense of self.’”) (second
alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted); accord In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,
442−43 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008).
95. See, e.g., Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 885; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441.
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behavior in the bedroom: a right to live outside the closet, and to
participate in the social institution of civil marriage. Religious believers
likewise claim a right to follow their faith not just in the insular setting of
worship services—but in the charitable work of their religious
organizations (adoption agencies, schools, etc.) and in their daily lives at
work and elsewhere.
5. Facing hostility
Finally, both same-sex couples and religious dissenters face the
problem that what they experience as among the highest virtues is
condemned by others as a grave evil.
Where same-sex couples see loving commitments of mutual care and
support, many religious believers see disordered conduct that violates
natural law and scriptural command. And where those religious
believers see obedience to a loving God who undoubtedly knows best
when he lays down rules for human conduct, many supporters of gay
rights see intolerance, bigotry, and hate. Because gays and lesbians and
religious conservatives are each viewed as evil by a substantial portion
of the population, each is subject to substantial risks of intolerant and
unjustifiably burdensome regulation.96

And both groups often find themselves in the minority. Christians
overall may constitute a majority in America, but conservative Christians
are only a subset, and they often face hostility from liberal Christians.97
Conservative Christians may dominate a red state like Alabama, but in
liberal states they are a minority—one whose views are increasingly
despised as a basic threat to the social order.
***
“The classically American solution to this problem is to protect the
liberty of both sides.”98 The Court was right to recognize same-sex civil
marriage. For many of the same reasons, there should also be strong rights
for dissenting religious individuals and organizations, as well as for
religious liberty in other contexts.
What does the Masterpiece decision mean for the project of protecting
both sides? The majority opinion sets the right general tone: It reaffirms
the right of same-sex couples to dignity and equality, and it insists that
religious believers who object to same-sex marriage must also be treated

96. Brief of Laycock et al. in Obergefell, supra note 90, at 1516.
97. For discussion of the complexities that make socially traditionalist Christians (sometimes)
a minority, see Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L. Q.
919, 94158 (2004).
98. Brief of Laycock et al. in Obergefell, supra note 90, at 16.
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with tolerance and respect.99 But the Court did not decide the broad
questions in the case: whether nondiscrimination liability compelled
Phillips to speak in violation of the First Amendment, and whether the
effect on his speech and religious conscience was justified by a
compelling governmental interest in prohibiting discrimination. Rather,
as already noted, the majority ruled that the state civil-rights commission,
in adjudicating Phillips’s case, showed unconstitutional “hostility”
toward his beliefs. Masterpiece’s import depends on the scope of that
holding.
The evidence of hostility consisted first in the commissioners’
statements, discussed above, which called Phillips’s acts “despicable”
and drew comparisons to slavery and the Holocaust.100 This holding, like
any other that focuses on “smoking gun” statements revealing bad intent,
is easy to evade. Decisionmakers need only be more careful to conceal
their hostile attitudes toward traditionalist religious belief. But those
attitudes can still drive decisions, and the attitudes are widespread.
The other evidence of anti-religious hostility in Masterpiece will be
harder for states to conceal. In another set of cases, three different bakers
had refused requests from a conservative Christian to bake cakes with
religious symbols and quotations hostile to homosexual conduct.101 He
brought claims of religious discrimination, but the Colorado commission
rejected them; that is, it protected the bakers’ refusals.102 As the Supreme
Court found, the state’s treatment “of Phillips’ religious objection did not
accord with its treatment of these other objections.”103 For example, the
commission said that any message from the same-sex wedding cakes
“would be attributed to the customer, not to [Phillips],” but it did not
address that point with respect to the protected bakers. The commission
also said that the protected bakers’ willingness to make other cakes with
Christian themes for Christian customers was exonerating, but that
“Phillips’ willingness to sell [other cakes] to gay and lesbian customers

99. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732
(2018) (explaining that “these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect
to sincere religious beliefs”). Parts of the next few paragraphs draw on, for example, Thomas C.
Berg & Douglas Laycock, Masterpiece Cakeshop and Protecting Both Sides, TAKE CARE (June
15, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/masterpiece-cakeshop-and-protecting-both-sides.
100. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
101. Id. at 1730 (citing Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., No. P20140071X, at 4 (Colo. Civil Rights Div.,
Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/GateauxDecision.pdf; Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual,
Inc., No. P20140070X, at 4 (Colo. Civil Rights Div., Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/
files/LeBakerySensualDecision.pdf; Jack v. Azucar Bakery, No. P20140069X, at 4 (Colo. Civil
Rights Div., Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/AzucarDecision.pdf).
102. See id. (citing commission decisions).
103. Id. at 1730.
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[was] irrelevant.”104
Masterpiece held that this inconsistent treatment of Phillips and the
protected bakers showed “hostility” towards Phillips’s religious faith: the
state had been neither “neutral [nor] tolerant,” as cases like Lukumi
require, but had acted on “a negative normative ‘evaluation of the
particular justification’ for his objection.”105 To say that inconsistent,
more favorable treatment of analogous secular claims shows
unconstitutional hostility toward religion is potentially a powerful
principle. Left-leaning states and cities will be unwilling to force socially
liberal vendors to produce goods with conservative religious messages in
violation of their conscience; those states cannot then turn around and
require religiously conservative vendors to produce goods in violation of
their conscience.
But the requirement to treat claims consistently will be powerful only
if the courts take it seriously. States will try to manipulate rules to
rationalize unequal treatment of objectors with whom they agree and
disagree. In Masterpiece, four Justices accepted such a rationalization.
Justice Kagan’s concurrence argued (and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
agreed) that the state could treat the cases differently because the
protected bakers refused “to make a cake (one denigrating gay people and
same-sex marriage) that they would not have made for any customer,”
while Phillips refused to sell same-sex couples “a wedding cake that [he]
would have made for an opposite-sex couple.”106
As Justice Gorsuch explained in his concurring opinion,107 this reaches
a preordained result by manipulating the level of generality: saying that
the “anti-gay” cake had a distinctive message but treating the cake for the
same-sex wedding as merely a generic cake. If the category is cakes with
a message, as the protected bakers’ cases show, then one must consider
the message of a cake designed for a same-sex wedding. Often such a
cake will have some indication, even if symbolic or implicit, indicating
approval of the marriage—two brides, the couple’s names, a
rainbow—and that is a cake that Phillips would not sell to anybody. Even
without such symbols, the cake still sends a celebratory message. It
celebrates the marriage in question, and in context that is a same-sex
104. Id. There were several other inconsistencies detailed in the Christian Legal Society’s
amicus brief that Professor Laycock and I filed. Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 90, at 1821.
105. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993)).
106. Id. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring, joined by Breyer, J.); accord id. at 175051 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting, joined by Sotomayor, J.).
107. Id. at 1735 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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marriage. The cake’s context, and not just the explicit words or images
on it, must be considered to determine its message: as Justice Alito
observed at oral argument, two cakes saying “November 9, the best day
in history” have quite different meanings when one is done for a wedding
anniversary and the other for a racist church’s celebration of
Kristallnacht.108 In short, as the Colorado appeals court put it, the couple
asked Phillips to “design and create a cake to celebrate their same-sex
wedding.”109
The state court held that the protected bakers had permissibly refused
to provide the anti-gay cakes “because of the offensive nature of the
requested message.”110 The Supreme Court read the state court to be
acting “based on [its] own assessment of offensiveness,” an assessment
the government may not use as a basis for imposing penalties.111 Leslie
Kendrick and Micah Schwartzman criticize that reading: they say the
state court and commission merely “implied that the baker (not the
[commission]) ‘deemed’ those [anti-gay] messages ‘offensive.’”112 But
even if that is true, it does not eliminate the discrimination between the
two sets of bakers, for Phillips likewise found the celebratory message of
a same-sex wedding cake offensive to his religious views of marriage.
Protecting one claimant’s determination of offensiveness and not the
other’s (opposing) determination is the essence of the discrimination.113
108. Transcript of Oral Argument at 68, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
See also Sherif Girgis, Filling in the Blank Left in the Masterpiece Ruling: Why Gorsuch and
Thomas
Are
Right,
PUB.
DISCOURSE
(June
14,
2018),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/06/21831/.
109. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015).
110. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731 (quoting Craig, 370 P.3d at 282 n.8).
111. Id. (adding that “it is not . . . the role of the State or its officials to prescribe what shall
be offensive”).
112. Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 55, at 144 n.74 (emphasis and brackets added,
quotations omitted); see id. at 144 (“[The state court] simply reported, and affirmed, the
[commission’s] conclusion about the bakers’ reasons.”).
113. Nor can the distinction be that the anti-gay message was not just “offensive” but was
“denigrating” of gay people. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring);
Robert W. Tuttle & Ira C. Lupu, Masterpiece Cakeshop—A Troublesome Application of Free
Exercise Principles by a Court Determined to Avoid the Hard Questions, TAKE CARE (June 7,
2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/masterpiece-cakeshop-a-troublesome-application-of-freeexercise-principles-by-a-court-determined-to-avoid-hard-questions (“[T]he agency properly
expressed concern that the requested messages disparaged members of the LGBT community. Such
a message is inconsistent with the basic policies of the public accommodations law.”). Drawing
that distinction plainly discriminates in favor of conscientious viewpoints that the state believes
promote “tolerance and equality” over opposing views. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
391 (1992). A distinction between “denigrating” and “non-denigrating” views would allow exactly
the kind of viewpoint discrimination that the Court in R.A.V. condemned: a hypothetical law
allowing a sign saying “that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten, but not that all ‘papists’ are,”
because the latter would constitute an “insult.” Id. at 39192.
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Under Lukumi, the government violates the Free Exercise Clause when it
“devalues religious reasons for [acting] by judging them to be of lesser
import than nonreligious reasons.”114 When the state cares enough about
other bakers’ judgments of offensiveness to hold the bakers non-liable,
but then ignores Phillips’ judgment of offensiveness, it devalues his
belief.
Kendrick and Schwartzman also make much of the fact that while
Phillips’ refusal fit Colorado’s definition of discrimination based on
customers’ sexual orientation, the other bakers’ refusal did not fit the
state’s definition of discrimination based on the customer’s religion. 115 It
is true, of course, that requesting anti-gay messages does not correlate
closely with “religion,” since some people oppose same-sex marriage for
nonreligious reasons and, of course, many people support it for religious
reasons. But discrimination against “religion” in the abstract is not the
issue; Colorado law prohibits discrimination against “all aspects of
religious beliefs, observances or practices . . . as well as the beliefs or
teachings of a particular religion, church, denomination or sect.”116
Opposition to same-sex civil marriage obviously correlates very closely
with the “particular” religious “belief or teaching” that God ordained
marriage and sexual intimacy to be male-female only. What the
conservative Christian customer requested on cakes—and the bakers
refused to provide—was that particular religious message, in the form of
quotes from Leviticus, Psalms, and Romans calling same-sex acts
sinful.117
In any event, whatever the state’s specific definition of religious
discrimination, the bottom line is that the other bakers were allowed to
refuse a cake whose message they believed offensive, and Phillips had a
similar belief. The state cannot rebut a First Amendment claim of
discrimination between opposing viewpoints merely by pointing to how
its statutes define religious discrimination. The Constitution trumps
statutes. As Professor Laycock and I noted in our brief in Masterpiece:
Even if the court’s alleged distinctions . . . succeeded in placing the two
sets of bakers in different doctrinal categories under state law, that
would not change the bottom line. The conscience of bakers who
support same-sex marriage, or refuse to oppose same-sex marriage, is
114. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993).
115. Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 55, at 15657. See also James M. Oleske, Free
Exercise (Dis)honesty, 2019 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming), at 46–47, https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3262826.
116. 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 708-1:10.2(H) (LexisNexis 2018). See also Civil Rights Act of
1964 § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2017) (defining protection from discrimination to extend to
“all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief”).
117. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1749 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the
requested cakes).
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protected. The conscience of bakers who object to same-sex marriage
is not protected.
This discrimination is like the ordinance in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992), where racial epithets were illegal, but “racist,”
“bigot,” and a vast range of other offensive epithets were permitted.
State law placed the two sets of epithets in different doctrinal categories,
and the correlation between epithets hurled and speakers regulated was
imperfect. But these distinctions could not save a regime that effectively
“license[d] one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the
other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.” Id. at 392. It is no more
defensible here to allow one side to follow the dictates of conscience
while requiring the other side to submit its conscience to the demands
of any customer who walks in the door.118

Contrary to the claims of critics, this analysis would not “render every
civil rights law in the nation vulnerable to free exercise challenges.” 119
The analysis from Masterpiece applies when the state allows refusal of
expressive goods or services on the ground that the provider objects to
the message they would express—and then prohibits another provider
from refusing expressive goods or services on the ground that she objects
to their message for religious reasons. And even when such
discrimination is established, the state may have a compelling interest in
denying an exemption if it would materially limit customers’ access to
goods or services, or if its logic is so broad that it would lead to repeated
refusals. Neither of those limits applied in Masterpiece, nor do they apply
in most wedding-vendor cases.
But if a state has not treated similar cases inconsistently, then it will
probably satisfy the First Amendment standard of neutrality and general
applicability. Objectors in that situation will have to rely on state RFRAs
or state constitutions, claims that the Supreme Court has no power to
review. But the cases will still pose the larger issue: Should conscientious
objectors to same-sex marriage be protected from participation in samesex weddings? More broadly, what courses of action can give meaningful
protection to both sides?
B. Protecting Both Sides
1. Nondiscrimination legislation with exemptions
The most direct way to protect both sides is for legislatures to enact
nondiscrimination legislation protecting LGBT people while also
providing meaningful exemptions for religious organizations—not just
houses of worship, but also religiously affiliated schools and social
118. Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. in Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 90, at 2021.
119. Oleske, supra note 115, at 48.
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services. (Hold for a moment the question of bakers and florists.) Utah
passed such a law in 2015. Deep-red Utah now protects LGBT persons
against employment discrimination, statewide, while also exempting
religious organizations.120 Utah has unique characteristics, and
repeating its achievement elsewhere is difficult. The Mormon Church
threw its unparalleled weight behind the effort, and the existing laws
already had broad religious exemptions that were simply carried over to
gay-rights claims. But Utah shows possibilities for how to proceed.121
Negotiation is in the interest of both sides. In thirty states or just
under, a significant majority of states, LGBT individuals have no
statewide protection against private businesses denying them service or
employment.122 As the saying goes, “You can get married on Saturday
and be fired on Monday.” These states are where LGBT people most
need statutory protection; in the twenty or so blue states and the major
cities where protection exists, gays already enjoy wide social
acceptance anyway. But new statutes are very unlikely to pass in reddish
states and in Congress unless they include exemptions for religious
organizations. And while the Supreme Court could order same-sex civil
marriage over the objections of conservative states, no federal court can
create nondiscrimination liability for private entities: it is up to the
legislature.
Yet a few years ago, many gay-rights groups withdrew support for
any exemption beyond the narrow case of employment of clergy. 123 I
think former Rep. Barney Frank was right that the leaders of those
groups are misguided, making the perfect the enemy of the good. 124
Religious conservatives are likewise recalcitrant and misguided.
120. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-112 (West 2015).
121. Jonathan Rauch, The Landmark LGBT-Mormon Compromise in Utah, BROOKINGS (Mar.
17,
2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/03/17/the-landmark-lgbt-mormoncompromise-in-utah/.
122. See State Maps of Laws & Policies: Public Accomodations, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (last
updated June 11, 2018), https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/public-accomodations (showing
twenty-eight states with no public-accommodations protection concerning sexual orientation or
gender identity); see also State Maps of Laws & Policies: Employment, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (last
updated June 11, 2018), https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/employment (showing twenty-eight states
with no protection of private-sector employees against such discrimination in employment, eleven
of which prohibit discrimination by public but not private employers).
123. See Joint Statement on Withdrawal of Support for ENDA and Call for Equal Workplace
Protections for LGBT People, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/
joint_statement_on_enda.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
124. See, e.g., Amanda Terkel, Barney Frank Sharply Criticizes Gay Rights Groups’ Flip on
ENDA, HUFFPOST (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/05/barney-frankenda_n_5650751.html (quoting former Rep. Barney Frank) (“The religious exemption we had was
the least we could put in there to pass the [federal] bill. . . . What they’re saying is, because it does
not give perfect protection, let’s not give any added protection at all.”).
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They ignore the fact that they face a ticking demographic time bomb.
Not only do most Americans now support same-sex marriage rights, but
each successive generation supports them more strongly 125—and may
become increasingly inclined to dismiss religious liberty as a cover for
bigotry. If conservatives refuse gay-rights laws and exemptions now,
they will likely be stuck later with gay-rights laws and no exemptions.
2. The bounds of religious protections
The second way of respecting both sides is to develop proper
principles for determining the boundaries of religious freedom versus
societal interests and others’ rights. This article can do so only briefly.
Protecting both sides requires line drawing, but sensible lines and
distinctions are available. Courts deciding religious freedom cases, and
legislatures drafting exemptions in statutes, should consider several
factors.126 It is clearly important to assess how serious an effect
protecting religion would have on others. It also matters how close the
religious activity in question is to the core of religion. Protection for
houses of worship should be near absolute. Inevitably there will be less
absolute protection for religious schools and social services, and
especially for commercial business owners—on which I will say more
in a moment.
Overall, when an individual or organization claims an exemption from
nondiscrimination law based on religious conscience or identity, the
effects on others can be mitigated by two factors: notice of the religious
claimant’s policy and availability of alternative providers. Let me
consider these factors in the context of two recent disputes.
The first involves a California bill that would have withdrawn statutory
exemptions in nondiscrimination laws for religiously affiliated colleges
adhering to their tenets about sexual conduct and sexual identity. 127
Introduced in response to a handful of stories of Christian colleges
expelling students for same-sex behavior or assigning transgender
students to housing based on their biological sex at birth, SB 1146 would
have eliminated exemptions from nondiscrimination liability for any
125. See ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST., EMERGING CONSENSUS
ON LGBT ISSUES: FINDINGS FROM THE 2017 AMERICAN VALUES ATLAS,
https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/AVA-2017-FINAL-1.pdf.
126. For more extensive discussion of such factors, see Thomas C. Berg, Religious Exemptions
and Third-Party Harms, FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV., Oct. 2016, at 50, 5256; Thomas C. Berg,
Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103, 130–42 (2015);
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, and the Establishment Clause, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 137681 (2016).
127. See S.B. No. 1146 (Cal. 2016), available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1146.
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college whose students received Cal Grants, the state program for
low-income students analogous to federal Pell grants.128 The bill
provoked furious charges that it would “not only diminish religious
liberty . . . [but also] discriminate against minority communities,”129 since
the evangelical and Catholic colleges affected servely disproportionately
large numbers of Hispanic (and in, turn, low-income) students.130 “[N]o
one is compelled to attend a private religious college,” said one critic, and
“[t]hose who do so make a deliberate decision because they are seeking
an academic environment and community where they can live, learn and
serve with others who share their beliefs, values and aspirations.”131
Facing this resistance, the bill’s sponsor pared it down to a requirement
that colleges give notice of their policies against same-sex or transgender
conduct.132 That requirement was perfectly defensible; LGBT students
should be able to have notice of colleges’ policies before deciding
whether to attend. Otherwise they may find themselves subject to
unexpected standards of conduct that they cannot easily escape. An
organization that holds itself out as religious—whether a congregation or
a meaningfully religious nonprofit—usually gives such notice,133 but not
always. The language of notice need not be highly specific; a general
statement that the organization applies religious norms of conduct to
employees or clients should suffice.
The second concept is that of alternatives, which make possible exit
from, or avoidance of, religious rules. When such alternatives exist, the
government should not force a religious provider to violate its religious
identity merely to ensure clients’ unfettered choice of providers. But
128. See, e.g., Tyler Wood, Chapter 888: Exemptions to Anti-Discrimination Laws in Higher
Education: What You Don’t Know Could Hurt You, 48 U. PAC. L. REV. 575 (2017); Thomas Berg,
Does This New Bill Threaten California Christian Colleges’ Religious Freedom?, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY (July 5, 2016), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2016/july-web-only/california-sb1146-religious-freedom.html. Although it was unclear whether SB 1146’s various versions would
directly disqualify students from Cal Grants, its imposition of liability on colleges would achieve
the same result by pressuring them to exit the program. Id.
129. National Hispanic Leaders Oppose California Bill SB 1146, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (July
19, 2016), http://religionnews.com/2016/07/19/national-hispanic-leaders-oppose-california-billsb-1146/.
130. Id.
131. Archbishop Jose Gomez & Bishop Charles Blake, Opinion, California Bill SB 1146
Threatens Minorities and the Poor, FOX NEWS (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/
2016/08/10/california-bill-sb-1146-threatens-minorities-and-poor.html.
132. See Patrick McGreevy, State Senator Drops Proposal That Angered Religious Universities
in California, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2016, 11:42 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/la-pol-sacessential-politics-updates-senator-drops-proposal-that-had-angered-1470853912-htmlstory.html.
133. There is often a “reasonable expectation that employees who work for churches and
religious-affiliated non-profits understand that their employers are focused on advancing a religious
mission.” See Micah Schwartzman et al., Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part III:
Reconciling Amos and Cutter, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 9, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause_9.html.
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religious organizations may be denied exemption when they occupy
“chokepoints,” where they can substantially limit others’ access to
services or employment. This is seldom so: usually, the objecting
religious organizations occupy just a small part of a much larger range of
providers, secular and religious, most of which have no objection. In the
dispute over California colleges, students had multiple options beyond
the objecting Catholic and evangelical institutions. The harm that
regulation would have done to religious colleges’ students was not
sufficiently justified.
What about for-profit businesses? In that sphere, protections for refusal
of service must be limited and carefully defined. There is a strong interest
in ensuring that all people have ready access to goods and services
without facing frequent rejection. And commercial businesses do not
inherently give notice of their religious nature.
But the right to refuse is justified in a limited category of cases like
Masterpiece, where individuals and small businesses object to providing
personal services (wedding photography, floral design, marriage
counseling) that directly facilitate ceremonies or relationships that they
regard as having religious significance, and other providers are readily
available. Such persons plausibly feel the most personal responsibility for
their actions contravening God’s commands. And the harms that their
refusal causes their customer are inherently limited.
One harm from discriminatory refusals is material: the customer loses
access to the goods or services or incurs material cost in obtaining them
elsewhere, for example, in rural areas with few providers. But in
Masterpiece, which arose in Denver, the couple quickly obtained a cake
from another baker. One brief filed in the case counted sixty-seven
bakeries in the Denver metro area that indicated they served same-sex
weddings.134 This is unsurprising; most jurisdictions with gay-rights laws
will have few shops inclined to refuse gay customers’ dollars.
The other harm is dignitary: the insult or indignity of being refused
because of the vendor’s religious or moral disapproval. This harm is real,
but it cannot be considered in isolation when a claim of liberty of
conscience stands on the other side. Religion is also a fundamental
identity, so penalizing the objector for her religiously driven conduct also
imposes a significant dignitary harm:
[B]akers willing to turn away good business for religious reasons
believe that they are being asked to defy God’s will, disrupting the most
important relationship in their lives, a relationship with an omnipotent
being who controls their fates. They believe that they are being asked
134. Brief of Amici Curiae Law and Economics Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 15,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
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to do serious wrong that will torment their conscience for a long time
after. . . . These are among the harms religious liberty is intended to
prevent, and the customer’s sense of being rejected or disapproved of
cannot justify inflicting such harms.135

Moreover, in a concrete way, the harm to the baker is greater:
Couples who obtain their cake from another baker still get to live their
own lives by their own values. They will still celebrate their wedding,
still love each other, still be married, and still have their occupations or
professions.
. . . [If the baker loses, he will] not get to live his own life by his own
values. He must repeatedly violate his conscience, making wedding
cakes for every same-sex couple who asks, or he must abandon his
occupation. The harm of regulation on the religious side is permanent
loss of identity or permanent loss of occupation. This permanent harm
is far greater than the one-time dignitary harm on the couple’s side.136

A narrow exception to gay-rights laws, in a religiously significant
context of intense importance to conscientious objectors, holds the best
hope of protecting both sides.
None of these arguments justifies religious exemptions for
significantly larger businesses or those with market power, whose
refusals could limit couples’ material access to goods or services. Nor do
the arguments justify protecting a hypothetical restaurant owner who
refuses to serve a same-sex couple. The claim that we would be validating
Jim Crow by protecting the baker is simply wrong. The restaurant owner
would be refusing service in a context with no close nexus to the specific
behavior she opposes, and allowing that refusal would authorize a far
wider range of refusals. Such distinctions between claims may seem
nuanced, but they are perfectly logical. They are worth making—whether
by courts or legislatures—if we want to value both religious freedom and
same-sex marital rights.
CONCLUSION
And we should value both rights. This article’s methodology has been
to identify parallels between various claims of equal freedom: between
Muslims and conservative Christians, between same-sex couples and
conservative Christians. If we can see and appreciate these parallels, it
may help us develop sympathy across our deep divisions. People will not
agree, but they might understand each other better. That in turn may help
us reach resolutions that both sides can live with.
We must support strong, nondiscriminatory religious freedom: in the
135. Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. in Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 90, at 31.
136. Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
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words of the Virginia Declaration, to be “equally entitled to the free
exercise of religion.”137 The culture war combatants, and Americans in
general, must reaffirm freedom for their opponents: in the words of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, “freedom for the thought that we
hate.”138 If we fail to do so, religious freedom will lose credibility as a
source of protection for anyone.

137. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16, http://www.constitution.org/bcp/virg_dor.htm
(emphasis added).
138. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled
in part by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).

